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Methodological Conservativism in Kant and Strawson 
John J. Callanan 
 
1. Introduction 
 
One might describe philosophical strategies that have the aim of protecting certain first-
order commitments against possible revision as methodologically conservative.1 In contrast, a 
methodological reformist is one for whom there are no particular first-order claims that must 
be accommodated within a successful philosophical theory. The methodological 
conservative can measure the adequacy of a philosophical theory in terms of its capacity 
to accommodate certain first-order claims specified as privileged; the methodological 
reformist measures the adequacy of a philosophy theory in other ways, in terms of its 
explanatory simplicity or expressive power or by appeal to other internal theoretical 
virtues. Both Kant’s transcendental idealism and Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics, I 
claim, are methodologically conservative philosophical projects. Kant and Strawson are 
also famously both advocates of the use of transcendental arguments.2 In this paper I 
examine the relations between their respective use of transcendental argumentation and 
their methodologically conservative approaches.   
One can distinguish two senses of methodological conservativism relating to the 
premises and the conclusions of arguments respectively. In the first sense, an inquiry is 
methodologically conservative if it takes some substantial premise as assumed and 
unrevisable by any further reflection. In the second sense, an inquiry is methodologically 
conservative if its conclusions are such that they recommend that no revision of our 
already-established ways of thinking about the world is required. Kant’s approach is 
methodologically conservative in both senses, I claim; Strawson’s approach is 
methodologically conservative in the latter sense only. The difference between them 
hinges on whether substantial – indeed a priori – propositions are appropriately 
accommodated as premises in the course of philosophical argumentation. For Kant, the 
success of the inquiry depends on the conclusions being consonant with particular 
                                                       
1 I am adapting the term from (Cowie 2015)  who uses it in the context of metaethics.   
2 As will be seen I use Strawson as a representative of one way in which transcendental 
arguments can be deployed. For more extensive recent discussion of Strawson’s relation to Kant 
see (Allais 2016; H. Allison 2016; Cassam 2016; Glock 2003; Gomes 2016; A. W. Moore 2016). 
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scientific commitments. For Strawson, the success of the inquiry depends on the 
independence of its results from any particular scientific commitments.   
The transcendental form of argument is usually presented as argumentation that 
typically begins by identifying some uncontroversial initial premise accepted by a 
sceptical interlocutor and then showing that the interlocutor is committed to some more 
substantial philosophical claim by virtue of the fact that the more substantial claims 
constitutes a necessary condition of the uncontroversial initial premise. How the 
arguments actually function is a matter of some contention.3 It is usually acknowledged 
however that the initial premise such arguments involve some minimal claim regarding 
time-perception, or self-consciousness, or the mere coherence of experience, etc. The 
initial premise is supposed to be one that a rational interlocutor would be hard-pressed to 
deny without a performative contradiction, since their denial itself would seem to 
constitute a self-conscious coherent temporal experience. The arguments then aspire to 
show that substantial metaphysical concepts such as those of causation and substance 
must apply if the initial minimal claims are to be granted. The conclusions reached 
establish that there is a core conceptual scheme that must be in place for all human 
beings for representation of an objective world to be possible. One could say then that 
an a priori proposition (in the sense of a necessary truth not derived from experience) e.g. 
that all experience must be structured by a particular category, is reached as the conclusion 
of this form of transcendental argumentation. Insofar as the conclusion conforms with 
our ordinary ways of thinking about the world (e.g., of the world as causally-structured or 
containing substances that undergo change) the results are methodologically 
conservative. 
A very different employment of transcendental argumentation is also at work in 
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.4 This strand takes as its initially accepted premise the actual 
                                                       
3 For discussion of transcendental arguments, see (Aquila 1976; Bardon 2005; Cassam 1987; 
Franks 2005; Stapleford 2008; Stern 1999, 2000, 2007; Stroud 1968, 1984; Vahid 2002) 
4 Henceforth the ‘First Critique’. References to Kant’s other writings are to the Cambridge 
Edition series of Kant’s works. Abbreviations used are as follows: 
 
(A/B)  Critique of Pure Reason, ed. and trans. P. Guyer and A. Wood (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1998).  
(Negative)  Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy in Theoretical 
Philosophy 1775–1770, trans. D. Walford and R. Meerbote (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
(ID)  On the form and principles of the sensible and the intelligible worlds in Theoretical Philosophy 
1775–1770, trans. D. Walford and R. Meerbote (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1992). 
(Inquiry)  Inquiry into the Distinctness of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morality in 
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possession of a priori cognition in the form of mathematical and scientific propositions.5 
This aspect of Kant’s project is one whereby substantial theoretical commitments are 
made explicit at the start and the aim of transcendental argument is to explain their truth 
as it manifests within a comprehensive metaphysical framework.6 Strawson tries to rescue 
the value of Kant’s project by jettisoning the latter’s scientific commitments and 
assumption of a priori cognition as a premise, while retaining the idea of a core 
conceptual scheme that can be uncovered by way of transcendental argumentation. Kant 
developed a radically innovative conception of the nature of metaphysical concepts – i.e. 
that they were part and parcel of the essential structure of ordinary forms of representing 
a world – specifically as a means of providing the basis for explaining just how the 
assumed scientific truths were in fact true.  
For Strawson, on the other hand, the ambition is different. Strawson’s view is that 
some of the concepts we take for granted in our everyday thinking about the world are in 
fact a necessary part of any conceptual scheme capable of objective thought at all. This 
claim is, in Strawson’s view, the crucial philosophical ambition inherited from Kant. For 
both Kant and Strawson, the use of transcendental arguments is closely tied to their 
methodologically conservativism. They are however methodological conservatives in 
                                                                                                                                                            
Theoretical Philosophy 1775–1770, trans. D. Walford and R. Meerbote (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
(MFNS)  Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, trans. M. Friedman, in Theoretical 
Philosophy after 1781, ed. H. Allison and P. Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). 
(Physical Monadology) The Employment in Natural Philosophy of Metaphysics Combined with Geometry, Of 
Which Sample I Contains the Physical Monadology, in Theoretical Philosophy 1775–1770, 
trans. D. Walford and R. Meerbote (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1992). 
(Prol.)  Prolegomena to any Future Metaphysics, ed. and trans. G. Hatfield in Theoretical 
Philosophy after 1781, ed. H. Allison and P. Heath (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). 
 
Page references are to the standard Akademie edition of Kant’s works, Kants Gesammelte Schriften, 
ed. Königlich Preussische Akademie der Wissenschaften, vols. 1–29 (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1902–). 
All references to Kant’s work are to the Cambridge Editions. References to the First Critique will 
use the standard A/B pagination; all other works will use in Akademie reference. 
5 For an interesting discussion of how to consider the role of apriority for Kant see (Politis 1997). 
6 The question ‘how are synthetic a priori judgments possible?’ is not meant to ask whether such 
judgments are possible, since on this reading Kant held that their possibility is shown by their 
actuality. For an examination of the Transcendental Deduction along these lines, see (Edgar 
2010). For readings whereby some substantive knowledge is assumed see (Ameriks 1978; 
Engstrom 1994). Which strand of argumentation is crucial for understanding Kant’s 
transcendental idealism is a contested issue, however, as shall be discussed. For examination see 
(Ameriks 1978) reprinted in (Ameriks 2003) and (O’Shea 2011).  
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importantly different senses.7 In Kant’s case the first-order claims that are immune to 
revision are those of mathematics and the sciences, and his means for explaining their 
non-revisability is to connect them with invariant structures in the mind. In Strawson’s 
case the non-revisable claims are the everyday characterizations of the world themselves 
– his aim is just to secure the status of the ordinary invariances in our conceptual 
vocabulary regarding our perceptual experience of the world. The idea that the world 
with which we engage is a spatiotemporal continuum of objective particulars is itself the 
first-order claim that Strawson seeks to show to be immune to revision. This difference 
in aim entails a notable difference with regard to their attitudes to the status of scientific 
inquiry. Kant’s project argues that whatever understanding of fundamental metaphysics 
emerges it must be one that can accommodate the actuality of scientific a priori cognition; 
Strawson’s project argues that whatever understanding of fundamental metaphysics 
emerges it must be one that is independent of any particular scientific knowledge-claim. 
As such, they both employ transcendental argumentation to secure their methodological 
conservativism, but with opposed visions as to the relation of those results to one’s 
scientific understanding of the world. 
The paper will be structured as follows. In §2 I outline varieties of the scientific 
variant of methodologically conservativism, comparing and contrasting Euler and Kant’s 
Pre-Critical use of scientific commitments for their philosophical aims. In §3 I briefly 
outline some of the familiar instantiations of this type of argumentation in the First 
Critique. In §4 I outline Strawson’s descriptive metaphysics as presented in Individuals and 
The Bounds of Sense, as well as in later work. I argue that for Strawson the appeal of 
transcendental argumentation is its promise of identifying a core conceptual vocabulary 
of human minds that would be deployed in the face of any revision of our scientific 
                                                       
7 Methodological conservativism, whether in regard to premises or conclusions, is a distinct 
position from the mere advocacy of transcendental arguments in general. For one could feasibly 
have a methodologically conservative position regarding substantial and unrevisable premises that 
doesn’t involve transcendental argumentation (e.g. G. E. Moore’s proof of an external world (G. 
E. Moore 1939)); similarly, one could have a methodologically conservative approach regarding 
some conclusions that have been reached in some way other than by transcendental argumentation 
(arguably Hume’s sceptical solutions to his own sceptical challenges in the Treatise involve a 
strategy of this sort – for discussion see (O’Shea 1996)). All transcendental argumentation is 
conservative with regard to some initial assumed premise of course, whether it is substantial or 
not, since this is what is supposed to generate the requisite anti-sceptical leverage. What 
constitutes a ‘substantial’ philosophical commitment is of course itself controversial, but for my 
purposes here it can be roughly determined in terms of what a rational interlocutor might be able 
to deny without the performative contradiction suggested above. Transcendental arguments need 
not be conservative with regard to their conclusions either: it is possible that the conclusions of 
such arguments are ones that recommended revision in our ordinary ways of thinking. I am 
grateful for an anonymous reviewer’s pressing me for some much-needed clarification here.  
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worldview, precisely for the purpose of avoiding Kant’s seemingly precarious 
dependence on particular scientific claims. In §5 I conclude with some suggestions of the 
different challenges regarding scientific theory that Kant and Strawson each face as a 
result of their deploying transcendental argumentation to the end of methodological 
conservativism. 
  
 
2. Euler and the Pre-Critical Kant  
 
Leonhard Euler begins his Reflexions Sur l’Espace et le Tems with a discussion of the role 
principles such as the First Law of Motion should play within philosophical discourse.8  
Bodies at rest will remain at rest unless acted upon and bodies in motion will continue in 
motion unless acted upon. What is the metaphysical relevance of claims such as these? 
Such propositions, Euler states, are more well-founded and well-confirmed than any 
claim found within metaphysics. They also concern the essential character of bodies in 
nature, which is supposedly the proper object of metaphysical inquiry. It is furthermore a 
proposition that does not appear itself to be at all accessible through what he regarded as 
standard forms of philosophical reasoning, e.g. syllogistic reasoning involving premises 
from indubitable first principles. Euler proposes the following normative rule of inquiry: 
 
[T]he awareness of these truths will be able to serve as a guide in these thorny investigations. For 
we shall be right to reject in this science all reasoning and all ideas that lead to conclusions 
contrary to these truths, however justified they may be elsewhere; and we shall be authorized to 
admit only principles that are consistent with these same truths. (Euler 1750, II) 
 
Euler goes on to argue that we cannot characterise these propositions unless we consider 
them as expounding the notion of a body possessing position within a real absolute 
spatial framework. He argues that the spatial position of a body, construed as a mere 
relation to other bodies, is inconsistent with how spatial representation of a body is 
represented in mechanics.9 Yet since it is an indubitable methodological starting point 
                                                       
8 Originally published in the Memoires de l’academie des sciences de Berlin 4, 1750, pp. 324-333. I make 
use here of a translation by Michael Saclodo and Pater Wake, available at the Euler Archive 
(http://eulerarchive.maa.org/pages/E149.html.)  
9 Euler claims that the relational (or, as Euler puts it, ‘metaphysical’) conception of space would 
entail that a body in water, whose position is determined by its immediately surrounding relations 
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that these scientific propositions constitute knowledge of empirical reality, Euler claims 
that we can infer the empirical reality of absolute space and time from such arguments. 
Thus any considerations metaphysicians might have that lead them to doubt the reality of 
space and time must simply be incorrect and ‘whatever sort of proof they bring forth to 
argue their opinion shall indeed be poorly grounded, and there will be some paralogism 
hidden in them’ (Euler 1750, XIV). For Euler, some scientific knowledge constitutes a 
non-revisable core of knowledge within the body of human knowledge in general. It is 
this third claim that is at work in Euler’s considerations above. For him no inquiry in 
metaphysics could ever come to displace or revise the known propositions of physics. 
Furthermore, this claim can subsequently be used to secure metaphysical results (he 
claims) alongside principles to the effect that we are committed to the objectivity of any 
metaphysical concepts necessarily deployed in the course of explicating the content of 
those propositions in physics.  
Euler’s Reflexions were praised by Kant in his Negative Magnitudes essay in 1763 and 
again in his formative Inaugural Dissertation in 1770.10 Given it is well-known that Kant 
held that Euler’s examination of space and time constituted a welcome challenge to the 
Leibnizian analysis of space, one that positively influenced his own, it is worth 
considering whether and to what degree he endorsed the philosophical methodology on 
display there. In 1763 Kant supports Euler’s scientism. Kant first acknowledges the false 
hopes of basing the method of metaphysics on that of mathematics.11 He claims, 
however, that this failure to use mathematics in terms of methodology has blinded many 
to the positive use of mathematics for philosophy – “the genuine application of its 
propositions to the objects of philosophy” (Negative Magnitudes, 2: 167 in (Kant 1992, 207)). 
Kant suggests that the relationship between metaphysics and mathematics has become 
needlessly antagonistic, in that the former has frequently ‘armed itself against’ the latter, 
by rendering mathematical concepts as “subtle fictions, which have little truth to them 
outside the field of mathematics”. Clearly the issue here concerns the proper referents of 
mathematical concepts and whether they relate to empirical reality or not. This is a 
misguided opposition, he suggests: 
                                                                                                                                                            
to the water around it, would retain its ‘position’ even when the water itself moved, a conclusion 
denied by the ‘mathematical’ analysis. I don’t evaluate the cogency of this argument here.  
10 ‘Attempt to Introduce the Concept of Negative Magnitudes into Philosophy’ and Concerning the 
Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World (the ‘Inaugural Dissertation’), both in (Kant 
1992). Kant nevertheless resists Euler’s conclusions at various points.  
11 For a discussion of the relationship between mathematical and metaphysical methodology in 
Kant, see (Callanan 2014).  
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It is not difficult to guess which side will have the advantages if two sciences enter into a dispute 
with each other, where the one excels all others in certainty and distinctness, while the other has 
only just started out on the path to these objectives. (Negative Magnitudes, 2: 167-8)  
 
Kant’s claim then is that the authority of mathematics and mechanics is not just with 
regard to the certainty of their propositions considered abstractly, but rather as 
characterizing empirical reality, i.e. the world as it is capable of being experienced. It is with 
regard to this battle that metaphysics is at a disadvantage, Kant maintains.  
Kant uses the example of the nature of space as characteristic of the misguided 
methodological values of metaphysicians. Here there is a vast body of epistemically 
secure data points in the form of geometry to which metaphysicians could appeal in 
determining their inquiries. Instead Kant complains, “these data are ignored and one 
relies simply on one’s ambiguous consciousness of the concept, which is thought in an 
entirely abstract fashion” (Negative Magnitudes, 2: 168).  As Kant presents it then, 
metaphysicians’ modus operandi is to begin with psychologically plausible intuitions – no 
doubt based on some perceptual observations of spatial properties and relations – and 
subsequently construct a theory of the nature of space itself. Ignoring scientific data is 
unwise in itself, Kant claims, but more egregious are the resulting manoeuvres made if 
the metaphysical theory is found to conflict with scientific data: 
 
If it should happen that speculation, conducted in accordance with this procedure, should fail to 
agree with the propositions of mathematics, then an attempt is made to save the artificially 
contrived concept by raising a specious objection against this science, and claiming that its 
fundamental concepts have not been derived from the true nature of space at all, but arbitrarily 
invented. The mathematical observation of motion, combined with cognition of space, likewise 
furnishes many data, which are capable of keeping the reflections of metaphysics concerning 
time on the path of truth. The celebrated Euler, among others, has provided a stimulus to 
reflections such as these. But it seems easier to linger among obscure abstractions which are 
difficult to test, than to enter into relations with a science which only admits intelligible and 
obvious insights. (Negative Magnitudes, 2: 168) 
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Occasionally Kant notes, a theory faces a challenge in the form of its incompatibility with 
a body of knowledge of space in the form of geometry.12 The proper procedure at this 
point, he implies, would be the rejection of the theory of space. Instead what happens is 
the downgrading of the status of geometry as revealing necessary truths about empirical 
reality. It is claimed instead that geometry tells us something of an idealized space, of 
space considered as a model, etc. that this idealized space does not reflect the nature of 
empirical reality and hence offers no opposition to the metaphysical theory of empirical 
space that the metaphysician is hawking. Kant tells us that the demand of metaphysics 
ought properly to be construed as that of vindicating a conception of empirical space 
that conforms with our known mathematical characterization of it. To abjure this 
criterion of falsification would be tantamount to renouncing testability as an epistemic 
norm itself.  
Kant anticipates his so-called ‘Argument from Geometry’ in the Inaugural Dissertation 
with reasoning to similar effect.13 He considers the proposition that between two points 
there is only a single straight line, a proposition he takes to be true of empirical reality. 
While Euler had argued that the First Law of Mechanics could only be true if Space were 
ontologically real, Kant claims that geometrical propositions such as these could only be 
true if Space were a pure intuition (Inaugural Dissertation, 2: 403, in (Kant 1992, 396)). The 
development of Kant’s idealism tracks his focus upon argumentation such as this. He 
sees in the claim that space is itself a pure intuition a means of showing that the object 
with which the propositions of geometry are concerned is identical to the object with 
which we are concerning when we take ourselves to have a perceptual acquaintance with 
empirical reality. The reasoning employed is that space must be such an intuition, for 
were it not so then we would lack a metaphysical basis for connecting our way of being 
perceptually related to empirical reality to what we know to be the correct scientific 
characterization of it. 
 
 
3. Critical Conservativism 
 
Kant’s ambition in the Critical period is of course to return metaphysics to the status of a 
science (A viii-ix). Yet by ‘science’ here Kant may be connoting something not radically 
                                                       
12 Kant is probably referring to a well-known geometrical proof of the infinite divisibility of space 
in Keill, see Physical Monadology, 1:478, in (Kant 1992) and Inquiry, 2:279, in (Kant 1992). 
13 I discuss the Argument from Geometry in the following section. 
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different in spirit from that characterization found (for instance) in Wolff’s Preliminary 
Discourse on Philosophy in General, that of “the habit of inferring conclusions by legitimate 
sequence from certain and immutable premises” (Wolff 1728/1963, II, §30, 17). Nothing 
in this conception of ‘science’ commits Kant to scientism understood pejoratively. With 
regard to the role of scientific claims in metaphysical argumentation, however, I argue 
that it is clear that Kant retains his view from the pre-Critical period and continues to 
hold a view similar to Euler’s. For Kant, no metaphysical manoeuvres could ever displace 
the knowledge that the sum of the internal angles of a triangle are always equal to the 
sum of two right angles, or that change in a substance never entails an increase or 
diminution in the quantity of matter involved. Kant frequently states how such 
knowledge must be possible, since it is actual.14 Kant’s metaphysical manoeuvres in the 
Critical Philosophy are on the contrary directed towards explaining how it is that such 
knowledge is possible, by providing philosophy grounds for explaining the nature of 
geometrical construction that accounts for Euclid’s proposition I.32, or by providing a 
validation of the concept of substance that entails Lavoisier’s law of the conservation of 
matter. 
Philosophical inquiries such as these have the character of being methodologically 
conservative in character with regard to the premises of inquiry. Although this form of 
methodological conservativism has been introduced here in terms of its scientific variant, 
it should be obvious that it need not take that form of expression. I regard as 
methodologically conservative also any philosophical inquiry that takes its modus operandi 
the vindication of accepted propositions from some other domain. Perhaps claims such 
as ‘I have two hands’, or ‘One must not treat human beings as mere objects’, or ‘I must 
sacrifice my son if God demands it’ might constitute propositions that a 
methodologically conservative philosopher views as ones that must be vindicated within 
any proper process of philosophical reflection.15 The most well-known example of 
Kant’s conservativism is in the so-called Argument from Geometry in the 
Transcendental Aesthetic.16 Here the argument schema in the Transcendental Exposition 
of Space is clear enough. Kant claims that 
 
                                                       
14 E.g. see Bx, Bxv-xvi, A4/B8, B4-5, B15, B20, A39/B55-6, A94/B127-8.  
15 Cf. (G. E. Moore 1939; Kant 1784/2014; Kierkegaard 1843/2006).  
16 For a sample of the relevant discussion see (Allais 2010; H. E. Allison 2004; Guyer 1987; 
Shabel 2004). 
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(i) If transcendental idealism were not true, then the known propositions of 
geometry would lose their distinct modal status;  
(ii) The propositions of geometry cannot lose that status, 
Therefore, 
(iii)  Transcendental idealism must be true.  
 
The argument is perhaps not compelling even if one were to accept the second premise. 
The motivation for accepting the conditional in the first premise is the thought that 
ontologically real items can only be passively received via sensory experience, the latter 
which is incapable of conveying necessary truths. Therefore if space were an 
ontologically real item then what we would learn of it would only hold the status of 
contingently true universal generalizations at best. My aim here is not to analyse or 
evaluate the argument but only to point to its obvious surface features.17 Kant’s explicit 
claim is that since we possess certain mathematical knowledge, we can motivate our 
metaphysical theories in accordance with the fact of that possession. Any metaphysical 
position, no matter how intuitive, must be rejected if it is incompatible with the fact of 
that possession; a metaphysical position, no matter how counter-intuitive, must be 
accepted if it is necessary to explain the fact of that possession.  
The Argument from Geometry has not fared well in general because it is thought to 
hinge upon Kant’s commitment to the claim that there is but one possible geometry, 
Euclidean geometry, and that it properly characterizes physical space. It is now known 
that neither of these claims is true. It is important to note that Kant interweaves his 
commitments in physics to his philosophical argumentation in other well-known areas of 
the First Critique.18 Kant highlights two claims in the B Introduction, Lavoisier’s Law of 
the Conservation of Matter and Newton’s Third Law of Motion: 
 
I will adduce only a couple of propositions as examples, such as the proposition that in all 
alterations of the corporeal world the quantity of matter remains unaltered, or that in all 
                                                       
17 There are some differing readings of the strategy of the Transcendental Aesthetic. Allison for 
example argues that the preceding Metaphysical Exposition is sufficient for Kant’s idealist 
conclusions (Allison 2004); Allais argues that Kant’s claim is that if transcendental idealism were 
false, then the propositions of geometry would lack referents (and presumably a truth-value) 
which is different from the claim that they would lose their modal status (Allais 2010). I’m 
inclined towards Guyer’s reading (Guyer 1987) here nonetheless (cf. (Shabel 2004)).  
18 For discussion of Kant’s Philosophy of science and the impact of science in general within his 
philosophy see (Brittan 1978; Buchdahl 1969; Cohen 2009; Friedman 1992; McLaughlin 1990; 
Watkins 2001).  
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communication of motion effect and counter-effect must always be equal. In both of these not 
only the necessity, thus their a priori origin, but also that they are synthetic propositions is clear. 
(B17) 
 
The principle of the First Analogy in the B-edition is stated as the claim that ‘[i]n all 
change of appearances substance persists, and its quantum is neither increased nor 
diminished in nature. (A182/B224).19 The argument for the necessity of the concept of 
substance for the possibility of experience is specifically adapted to make clear that the 
principle is meant to vindicate the Law of the Conservation of Matter. The very idea that 
the substratum of appearance does not go out of being during change is meant to have as 
its direct corollary the thought that the quantum of whatever makes up that substance 
cannot either decrease. Kant is clear that in arguing for this claim he is far from 
contradicting the ordinary commitments of our perceptual phenomenology. Rather he 
suggests that “at all times not merely the philosopher but even the common 
understanding has presupposed this persistence as a substratum of all change in the 
appearances, and has also always accepted it as indubitable…”(A184/B227). It is with 
regard to these specific claims that Kant states that ‘the understanding is itself the source 
of the laws of nature’ and that while the claim is ‘contradictory and strange’ (A144, cf. 
A127) it must nevertheless be accepted, since in his view it is the only means for 
preserving both the idea of their being laws of nature such as the Law of the 
Conservation of Matter at all as well as the commitments of everyday experience.  
The position I am attributing to Kant is not uncontroversial. A fuller defence of the 
image of Kant I am presented cannot be made here. Many Kant scholars would claim 
that my view attributes to Kant what Karl Ameriks has called a ‘strongly regressive’ 
strategy, one whereby Kant presupposes a priori scientific claims for his arguments.20 
Interpreting Kant in this way, it is feared, risks presenting the Critical Philosophy as an 
apology for Newtonianism. Ameriks claims this is a mistake. Kant’s project surely 
involves reconciling his Newtonian commitments with the implicit philosophical 
commitments of the everyday experience of ordinary folk. However, we are not to 
understand the reconciliation as the one that have been presenting it here, i.e. as an 
insistent vindication of specific propositions inherited from the sciences. Rather, 
Ameriks claims that Kant’s view is that “one can rather work primarily to determine a 
                                                       
19 For discussion of the First Analogy, see (Addis 1963; Cleve 1979; Van Cleve 1979; Sacks 2006; 
Ward 2001) 
20 (Ameriks 2003, Introduction, 7). 
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positive and balanced philosophical relation between the distinct frameworks of our manifest 
and scientific images”.21 Ameriks’s use of Sellars’s terminology is evocative here, since it 
suggests that Kant might have seen the activity of philosophy as that of negotiating 
apparent discrepancies between our scientific and manifest worldviews.22 Kant’s 
investigations can be seen as trying, among other things, to clarify the basic meaning and 
metaphysical presuppositions of Newtonian axioms, and yet, since his investigations first 
provide a general ground for causality, they do not— unlike “scientism”—simply take 
the objective truth of the scientific principles themselves as an absolute first premise 
(Ameriks 2001, 34). Instead, we should take it that ‘[s]cientific theory, elementary 
common knowledge, and philosophical interpretation are thus all intertwined in a 
process of reflective equilibrium’ (Ameriks 2001, 35).  
If we understand the process of transcendental philosophy as adopting the process of 
reflective equilibrium, in balancing maximal coverage of the intuitive data with a selection 
of general principles, then we should expect that we might find some statement of the 
notion that no particular claim is in principle immune to revision in the light of 
theoretical reflection.23 To my knowledge there is no such claim to be found in Kant’s 
writings. Certainly it seems that Kant thought the opposite in the case of the practical 
philosophy. Kant’s steadfast commitment was that no amount of philosophical reasoning 
could displace the disposition to regard ourselves as free, or of human beings possessing 
an innate dignity, of there being a God, etc.24 Moreover what we can find are explicit 
claims that the most sceptical theorist Kant envisaged himself would have abandoned his 
sceptical theories if they entail the rejection of certain forms of a priori cognition. Kant 
says as much about Hume, in claiming that Hume failed to realize that his own 
scepticism could be generalized to destabilize mathematical knowledge, had he realized 
that mathematics is a body of synthetic judgments (Prolegomena, 4: 272, Critique of Practical 
Reason, 5: 13). For Kant, the actuality of a priori cognition – in the form of mathematical 
cognition – presents a fixed data point impervious to theoretical leverage. The method of 
reflective equilibrium has been criticized for the disproportionate weighting of initially 
assumed intuitive data points, and Kant would be open to criticism were his claim merely 
that we ought to give a high regard to the claims of Newtonian physics and Euclidean 
                                                       
21 (Ameriks 2001, 33). Many of the same points are repeated in (Ameriks 2000, Ch. 1). 
22 (Sellars 1963).  
23 For the origins of reflective equilibrium as a methodology see (Goodman 1955; Rawls 1971). 
For a recent overview of its problems and prospects, see (Cath 2016). 
24 See for example A830-1, B858-9. 
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geometry.25 But his claim is that certain sceptical theories can be refuted simply on the 
grounds that they make mathematical a priori cognition impossible, indicating that his 
view is that no theoretical reflection could dislodge these initially assumed data points. 
Any philosophical approach that adopts that view cannot be characterized as engaged in 
reflective equilibrium. It is certainly the case that Kant’s – truly remarkable – ambition in 
the First Critique is to show that the intimate and largely implicit conceptual 
understanding of every human being’s own ordinary perceptual experience reflects 
traditional ontological concepts which in turn underpin core scientific principles. Kant’s 
approach is triply conservative in that it aims to vindicate traditional ontology, familiar 
phenomenology, and Newtonian science within a single inquiry.  
 
 
4. Strawson’s Descriptive Metaphysics 
 
Strawson’s project of descriptive metaphysics, outlined in Individuals, is famously 
indebted to elements of Kant’s Critical project.26 Descriptive metaphysics, Strawson 
claims, is the project of describing ‘the actual structure of our thought about the world’ 
in contrast to revisionary metaphysics, which is concerned to produce a better 
structure’.27 However, the distinction does not track a descriptive/normative distinction 
– instead descriptive metaphysics aims at outlining not just the ‘actual’ but the necessary 
structure of thought about the world. So described, it is noteworthy that such a project 
explicitly makes no claims at all on the structure of the world itself, but rather only our 
thought about it. One might presume that the special concern of revisionary metaphysics 
is that it can possibly identify ‘better’ and ‘worse’ metaphysical models, where the 
difference is marked just in terms of its accuracy in representing the world itself. 
Descriptive metaphysics in one sense then brackets this question.  Strawson says that 
thinking of revisionary metaphysics as exhaustive of the form of inquiry in general would 
be a ‘massive blunder’:  
 
                                                       
25 See (Cath 2016) for discussion. 
26 Strawson also identifies Aristotle as a precursor (Strawson 1959, 9). 
27 (Strawson 1959, 9). For discussion of descriptive metaphysics see (Burtt 1963; Haack 1979; 
Macdonald 2007). 
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For there is a massive central core of human thinking which has no history – or none recorded in 
histories of thought; there are categories and concepts which, in their most fundamental 
character, change not at all. (Strawson 1959, 10) 
 
Again the implied contrast with revisionary metaphysics would be that it is importantly 
tied to historical circumstances in that it takes its prerogative to integrate relevant 
information to inform its models.  
It is striking that Strawson retains the Kantian thought that the elements that 
constitute the unrevisable part of human thinking are those elements that are also the 
most ordinary. He claims that they are the ‘commonplaces of the least refined thinking; 
and yet are the indispensable core of the conceptual equipment of the most sophisticated 
human beings’ (Strawson 1959, 10). A familiar argument from Chapter One of Individuals 
is that a specifically spatiotemporal framework is a necessary condition of any conceptual 
scheme that is capable of individuating particulars.28 I will forego an examination of the 
details of the argument just to draw attention to the familiar features of its 
conservativism. Strawson begins with the claim that the human being’s conceptual 
scheme is one that represents the ‘world as containing particular things some of which 
are independent of ourselves’, that fundamentally ‘our ontology comprises objective 
particulars’ (Strawson 1959, 15). The conservativism emerges at the level of the conclusion 
in the claim that a specifically spatiotemporal domain is required in order to maintain the 
coherence of the initial premise. This claim, though perhaps open to question by the 
philosopher, is one that is no less intimate to ordinary experience than the initial premise.  
There is of course a long-standing debate on the anti-sceptical force of these 
arguments that I will not address here.29 Nor will I discuss in detail how we ought to 
understand the use of these arguments in the context of Strawson’s philosophical 
programme.30 Instead I hope just to use this sketch of a Kant-inspired transcendental 
strategy to illuminate two different strands within Kant’s own use of such arguments. On 
the one hand, Kant aimed, as Strawson did, to illuminate the necessary conditions of 
human beings’ representation of the world in its most general structure. On the other 
hand, Kant aimed, as Strawson did not, to present that representational structure as in 
                                                       
28 (Strawson 1959, 25). For some discussion see (Cassam 1997, 2005, 1997; Harrison 1970). 
29 The locus classicus is (Stroud 1968). For further discussion see (Stroud 1984, 1994; Stern 2000, 
2007).  
30 I turn to this however in fn. 32. For some relevant discussion see my (Callanan 2011).  
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principle exclusively capable of reflecting the determinate structure of empirical reality. 
In The Bounds of Sense, Strawson sets out this understanding of Kant’s insights: 
 
One who accepts not only the distinctions, but the accompanying account of metaphysics, might 
be supposed to congratulate Kant on having done quite a good job for the presuppositions of 
Newtonian physics and even to recommend him as a model for any successor-metaphysician 
willing to undertake the same job for quantum and relativity physics (Strawson 1995, 73).  
 
Strawson characterizes this view as effectively construing Kant as a revisionary 
metaphysician, thereby missing the crucial other dimensions of his strategy: 
 
Accepting this view would amount to giving up the idea that we may find in the Principles 
further elaboration of the general conclusions of the Transcendental Deduction into more 
detailed statements of generally necessary conditions of the possibility of any experience of 
objective reality such as we can render intelligible to ourselves (Strawson 1995, 73).  
 
Strawson notes that even if we grant that Kant mistook scientific propositions for 
absolutes then it “does not follow, from his making this mistake, that there are no 
statable necessary conditions of the possibility of experience in general” (Strawson 1995, 
74). Strawson is correct that Kant’s commitment to transcendental conditions of 
experience can be articulated without appeal to their connection to Newtonian physics, 
and so Kant’s commitment to the latter cannot by itself invalidate the former. The 
problem that this point obscures is that, as I have been arguing, Kant’s commitment to 
the idea that Newtonian principles are reflected in those transcendental conditions is his 
means of securing the entry point to empirical realism. If one eschews this final 
commitment, one requires an account of how it is that transcendental conditions of 
experience can and do reflect the structure of empirical reality.  
Even if descriptive metaphysics is understood as giving up on this ambition to reflect 
empirical reality, it faces a related problem in how we are to integrate the input of 
scientific theory with the transcendental conditions of experience. Strawson hints at an 
account in The Bounds of Sense when he suggests that there might be a “formal relation” 
between scientific principles and transcendental conditions, i.e. if “the presuppositions of 
a particular kind of science were, for instance, rather specific forms of the necessary 
conditions of experience” (Strawson 1995, 74). One might wonder how one might justify 
a claim to the effect that for any given scientific theory, its presuppositions must reflect 
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the transcendental conditions on experience. In responding to a worry about how 
descriptive metaphysics copes with scientific theory change, Strawson acknowledges that 
our conceptual vocabulary can and must be continually modified by the input of the 
sciences without this threatening the project: 
 
Yet there is a core of human conceptual equipment from which all the modifications start, which 
we cannot dispense with and of which it has been my effort to give an at least partial description. 
Any such attempt, as the history of philosophy shows, is likely to be to some extent impure, in so 
far as it is liable to be affected by the state of knowledge and the general climate of at the time at 
the which the attempt is made. (The most striking example of this is provided by Kant’s over-
confident faith in Newtonian physics.) But the attempt itself is worth making all the same. 
(‘Replies’ in (Strawson, Sen, and Verma 1995, 410))  
 
Strawson’s methodological conservativism, I would suggest, is directed towards the 
thought that no scientific inquiry could displace ordinary commitment to claims such as 
these. It is his commitment to the reality of this core that motivates the need for 
descriptive metaphysics, to the justification of the very idea of an invariant core within 
the structure of human thinking. Strawson motivates this position in direct opposition to 
the Kantian conception of the project, however. While Kant thought that the project was 
required to vindicate Newtonian physics, Strawson acknowledges, it can be reformulated 
otherwise. By rendering the conceptual core as the necessary conditions of all theory-
revision in general, the conceptual core is invulnerable to the vicissitudes of theory-
revision.31 If the project of descriptive metaphysics were successful it would follow that 
the necessary conditions of thinking about the world also afford the necessary originating 
conditions for scientific theory construction. It does not follow, however, that the 
theories constructed must conform to those initial conditions. It seems eminently 
plausible to maintain that a unified spatiotemporal framework is a necessary condition of 
our experience – and a fortiori of our scientific theory construction practices – while 
allowing the possibility that a scientific theory might be formulated under those 
                                                       
31 A similar claim is made in Skepticism and Naturalism: Some Varieties, where Strawson claims that 
any change to our world-view would nevertheless always remain “a human world-picture: a 
picture of a world of physical objects (bodies) in space and time including human observers 
capable of action and of acquiring and imparting knowledge (and error) both of themselves and 
each other and of whatever else is to be found in nature” (Strawson 1985, 27).  
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conditions that nevertheless claimed that a spatiotemporal framework is not a necessary 
feature of empirical reality.32  
 
 
5. Conclusion: Conservativism and Science 
 
I have claimed that while a certain methodological conservativism is a hallmark of both 
Kant and Strawson’s projects, though they each represent and defend very different 
forms of conservativism. While Kant and Strawson are both methodological 
conservatives, Kant’s conservativism is motivated by the need to vindicate particular 
scientific commitments; Strawson’s conservativism is motivated by the need to avoid 
such commitments. Neither example of the general shared strategy – i.e. that of 
deploying transcendental arguments in aid of a methodological conservativism – is 
without its problems in their respective conceptions. Kant’s strategy is of course 
infamously vulnerable to its contingent commitments to specific historically-situated 
scientific claims. While Kant’s appeal to shared structures of human experience is his 
means to the end of securing those scientific claims, for Strawson the identification of an 
invariant core of human thinking about the world is an end in itself. Kant’s own end, that 
of providing a metaphysical vocabulary for his scientific worldview, is dismissed by 
Strawson as an unfortunately co-instantiated disposition towards revisionary 
metaphysics. Yet, as I have tried to suggest, Kant’s tight connecting of the manifest and 
                                                       
32 I don’t mean to imply that Strawson is unaware of this feature of his project or that he lacks 
strategies for addressing it. The argument of ‘Freedom and Resentment’ for example seems to 
include a claim that we can’t make sense of how a scientifically-informed determinism might 
undermine our recourse to reactive attitudes, at least not without forgoing conceptualizing 
ourselves as forming ‘human society’ (Strawson 1974, 24). My complaint is only that descriptive 
metaphysics both lacks and needs an account as to why this is the case, if it is true. As an 
anonymous reviewer rightly points out to me, a version of this issue is explicitly addressed in 
Strawson’s ‘Perception and its Objects’. There Strawson tentatively suggests the relativity and 
parity of the common-sense and scientific standpoints, and criticizes the ‘hardliner’ scientific 
realist for whom the latter standpoint is ‘superior’ (Strawson 1988, 112). Strawson claims that 
without such appeals to relativism, the scientific realist is committed to claim that the 
commonsense picture of experienced objects is a necessary and moreover ineliminable enabling 
condition for their own theorizing against the fundamental accuracy of that very picture. Thus 
Strawson concludes that this position must conclude that ‘our thought is condemned to 
incoherence’ albeit an incoherence ‘we can perfectly live with and could not perfectly well live 
without’ (Strawson 1988, 112). An evaluation of these kinds of defences is beyond the scope of 
this paper – my aim here has only been to emphasise that metaphilosophical manoeuvres of just 
this kind, e.g. presenting a choice between relativism and the merits or otherwise of living with a 
self-conception of human thinking as condemned to incoherence, are required by the 
methodological conservativism of descriptive metaphysics. 
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scientific images was his attempt to soothe a reasonable worry that they might lack a 
connection at all. As Euler had pointed out, the metaphysician who prioritised the 
intuitions generated by the manifest image displayed what he and Kant saw as a 
disturbing tendency to downgrade the relevance of scientific theories in relation to other 
epistemic commitments.  In rejecting Kant’s scientistic concerns, Strawson also eschews 
one philosophical narrative about how the structure of ordinary human cognition is at 
least in principle compatible with the results of scientific inquiry.  
 Stroud’s well-known critique of Strawson’s use of transcendental arguments points 
out that if one forgoes extra philosophical support – such as the tenets of transcendental 
idealism – then one is left with a strategy that does not even address the task of 
explaining how or even whether transcendental conditions afford epistemic contact with 
an ontologically independent world at all. Even if one accepts this criticism of descriptive 
metaphysics, a related tension can be generated within a more modestly framed project 
of descriptive metaphysics. If one considers descriptive metaphysics as merely the 
project of tracing the structure of thinking about the world, one still is left with the issue 
of the reconciliation of the manifest and scientific images. As seen above, at various 
points Strawson gestures at how descriptive metaphysics might be hoped to constrain or 
at least be compatible with scientific outcomes. However, the essential character of the 
project of descriptive metaphysics is premised on the notion that the grounds that 
determine the most general features of human thinking are independent of any particular 
scientific claims. Yet if these are indeed independent forms of inquiry, then there is no 
obvious sense in which the results of scientific inquiry are at all constrained by the 
demands of descriptive metaphysics. It seems perfectly possible to imagine, for instance, 
that a scientific inquiry undertaken within the constraints of thinking about an objective 
world as one of spatiotemporal particulars embroiled in causal relations with each other 
might nevertheless ultimately conclude with results that speak in favour of the unreality 
of time or causation or some other essential aspect of that conceptual framework. Even 
if one brackets the question of the inference to reality, the Strawsonian project has a 
question of how to effect an internal reconciliation of the claims of descriptive 
metaphysics with the outcomes of scientific inquiry. 
The use of transcendental argumentation as a means to Strawson’s conservativism 
could be viewed as a hindrance rather than a help here. Were the respective inquiries to 
generate opposed outcomes, there are scant resources within descriptive metaphysics to 
explain how to relate or prioritize those outcomes. If, though, scientific outcomes were 
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to be viewed as epistemically recommended over the claims of descriptive metaphysics – 
as would seem possible in at least some cases – then the fact that the claims of 
descriptive metaphysics are secured by transcendental argumentation might be thought 
to exacerbate the problem. Were a scientific outcome to oppose a claim of descriptive 
metaphysics, then it would follow that a successful transcendental argument would 
establish that we are rationally compelled to think of things in ways that we also think are 
less epistemically recommended. This is not to say that the determined descriptive 
metaphysician cannot bring other considerations to bear to ameliorate this concern. Yet 
were one to do so, those reflections would plausibly be ones that go beyond the 
resources of descriptive metaphysics itself and instead constitute some further 
philosophical reflections on the status of the results of descriptive metaphysics within a 
further synoptic world-view.33    
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